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TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1, SECTION 12
[Rights of accused persons]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to . . . have a speedy public trial . . .
U.S. CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial. . . .
UTAH CODE ANN. 77-29-5
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS
(ADDENDUM J)

V.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)(h) whereby a defendant in a criminal action may take an
appeal to the Supreme Court from a final judgment of conviction of a
first degree felony.

In this case final judgment and conviction was

rendered by the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

vi.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in refusing to dismiss the

charges against Mr. Martin pursuant to Article III of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers?
(a)

Did Mr. Martin substantially comply with the

requirements of the Act in requesting disposition of the
charges so as to trigger the 180 day limitation?
(b) Had the 180 days run?
2.

Did the delay in bringing Mr. Martin to trial violate

his right to speedy trial under the Utah and United States
Constitutions?

vii.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

TERRY MARTIN,

:

Case No. 870009

:

Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony.

Appellant was found

guilty on December 16, 1986 after a bench trial on stipulated
evidence in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, presiding.

A charge

of Aggravated Kidnapping was dismissed by the State as part of the
proceedings.

The Court sentenced Mr. Martin to five years to life

in the Utah State Prison to commence upon being released from the
federal prison system.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In November, 1985, Mr. Martin was being held on federal
charges in New Mexico (See Addendum A and B, R. 73). He was aware
of outstanding charges against him in Utah and requested use of the
Bernalillo County (New Mexico), Detention Center Law Library to
determine how to take care of such charges.

His request was denied

because the Court had appointed counsel to represent him on the
federal charges (See Addendum A ) .

Mr. Martin was sentenced on the federal charges in New
Mexico on January 17, 1986 (R. 73). Thereafter, Mr. Martin's court
appointed counsel on the federal charges notified Richard Shepherd,
Salt Lake Deputy County Attorney, in writing, of Mr. Martin's
request for disposition of the pending Salt Lake County charges
under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (hereinafter l.A.D.).
Defense counsel informed the County Attorney that Mr. Martin had
been sentenced in the federal proceedings, but had not yet been
assigned to a federal prison, and gave Mr. Shepherd all necessary
information to locate Mr. Martin upon his transfer.

Counsel's

letter to the County Attorney was received February 24, 1986 (R.
94) .

(See Addendum B ) .
On March 14, 1986, the Salt Lake Deputy County Attorney

received confirmation that his warrant for Mr. Martin had been
forwarded to the United States Prison in Lompoc where Mr. Martin was
assigned and had arrived on March 12 (Addendum C ) .

A month later,

on April 11, 1986, the Salt Lake Deputy County Attorney prepared and
sent to Lompoc a request for temporary custody under Article IV of
the l.A.D. (R. 77) (Addendum D ) .

The State has not established when

that document was received by authorities in Lompoc, however, it was
apparently received on approximately May 14, 1986.

(See Addenda D

and J.)
On May 14, 1986, the appellant was officially notified
that a detainer had been lodged against him in favor of Utah
(Addendum E ) .

The document informing Mr. Martin of the detainer

indicated that should Mr. Martin desire to file a request for
disposition, he should notify his case manager.

Mr. Martin

immediately notified his case worker that he wished to request final
disposition of the Salt Lake County charges, as indicated by the
- 2
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note penciled in on the upper right hand corner "wants to file on
these."

(See Addendum E.)

Apparently, this is the only document,

advice or information the custodial authorities gave Mr. Martin
regarding the Utah charges (R. 73).
On May 19, 1986, the Salt Lake County Attorney's office
received a Detainer Action letter dated May 14, 1986, indicating
that the Salt Lake County detainer had been filed (Addendum F).

The

May 14, 1986 letter also indicated that Mr. Martin was currently on
a federal writ, and that Lompoc would continue the I.A.D. process on
his return.

(See Addendum F.)

In a letter dated May 29, 1986, Mr. Martin's lawyer on
the federal charges in California informed Mr. Shepherd of the Salt
Lake County Attorney's office that Mr. Martin had been sentenced on
his federal charges, and was reasserting his request for speedy
disposition of the Salt Lake County charges (Addendum G ) .

The Salt

Lake County Attorney's office received that letter on June 2, 1986
(Addendum G ) .

On June 4, 1986, Mr. Martin was transferred back to

the federal prison at Lompoc (R. 73).
The Salt Lake Deputy County Attorney wrote Lompoc on June
18, 1986 requesting information on Utah's request for temporary
custody, mentioning appellant's demand for a speedy trial (See
Addendum H ) .
Lompoc did not reply to the June 18 letter until August
22, 1986; the County Attorney did not receive that reply until
September 5, 1986 (See Addendum I).

That letter, dated August 22,

1986, indicated that "Mr. Martin will be available to be taken into
state custody on or after June 15, 1986."

- 3 -

The letter offered no

explanation for failing to inform Salt Lake County that Mr. Martin
had been available for over two months.
Mr. Martin was transferred and booked into the Salt Lake
County Jail on October 24, 1986 (T. 8) and brought to trial December
16, 1986 (R. 109) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Martin did everything within his power to trigger the
180 day period under Article III of the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers, and substantially complied with the provisions of that
act by February 24, 1986.

The State of Utah was informed that Mr.

Martin had been sentenced, his period of imprisonment, information
on how to locate him in the federal system and his desire for speedy
disposition of the charges at that time.

Mr. Martin should not be

penalized for the lack of diligence by California and Utah in
informing him of the detainer and in transferring him to Utah and
bringing him to trial.

Because Mr. Martin was not brought to trial

within 180 days of his request for disposition, the charges should
have been dismissed.
The delay in bringing Mr. Martin to trial on the Salt
Lake County charges violated his right to a speedy trial under the
Utah and United States Constitutions, and the charges should
therefore be dismissed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. SALT LAKE COUNTY DID NOT BRING MR. MARTIN
TO TRIAL WITHIN 180 DAYS OF HIS REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION
AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE III OF THE INTERSTATE
AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS.

A.

MR. MARTIN SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH
THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE III OF THE
I.A.D. SO AS TO TRIGGER THE 180 DAY PERIOD.

The provisions of Article III of the I.A.D. are applicable,
"(w)henever a person has entered upon a term of
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution
of a party state, and whenever during
the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is
pending in any other party state any untried
indictment, information or complaint on the basis of
which a detainer has been lodged against the
prisoner, . . .
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 (1953 as amended).

See

Addendum J for entire text of the I.A.D.
Article III (a), of the I.A.D. provides that a
defendant "shall be brought to trial within 180 days after he
shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer
and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's
jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment
and his request for a final disposition to be made
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 (1953 as amended).

..."

Article III (b)

provides that the "written notice and request for final
disposition . . . be given or sent by the prisoner to the
warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having
custody of him . . ." and that such custodial authorities shall
promptly send it to prosecutors in the receiving state.
In the present case, Mr. Martin was sentenced on the
federal charges in New Mexico on January 17, 1986 (R. 73). His
term of imprisonment for purposes of the I.A.D. began on that
date.

See Romans v. District Court, 633 P.2d 477, 481 (Colo.

1981).
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As the Court noted in Huges v. District Court, 593
P.2d 702 (Colo. 1979) when an order of commitment had been
issued by the federal district court in Dallas committing the
petitioner to the custody of federal authorities:
His seven-year sentence began running on that date [time
sentenced]. At that time, he was clearly imprisoned.
The fact that the petitioner had not been transported to
his eventual place of imprisonment at the time the
detainer was lodged by the Denver sheriff's office is
irrelevant. He was where the federal authorities wished
to keep him.
Id. at 705.

See also Nash v. Carchman, 558 F. Supp. 641 (1983)

(defendant's demand for speedy disposition effective as of
sentencing); See also United States v. Hutchins, 489 F. Supp. 710,
715 (N.D. ind. 1980) .
Salt Lake County apparently filed a detainer based on the
charges in the instant case while Mr. Martin was still in New
Mexico.

In the letter dated February 21, 1986, to Richard Shepherd,

Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, Mr. Martin's court appointed
counsel requested a speedy final disposition of the charges pending
in Salt Lake County (See Addendum B).

In a letter dated March 13,

1986, the United States Marshall for the District of New Mexico
informed Mr. Shepherd that the Salt Lake County warrant on Mr.
Martin, along with the paperwork on the New Mexico charge, had been
forwarded to the United States Prison at Lompoc, California, where
Mr. Martin was serving his sentence (Addendum C ) .

Mr. Martin

arrived at Lompoc prison on March 12, 1986, the day before this
letter was written (R. 73). Hence, the Salt Lake County warrant was
included in Martin's paperwork when he was transferred to Lompoc
Prison, and the detainer had been filed at that time.
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Although Article III (c) of the I.A.D. requires that
"(t)he warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having
custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and
contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform
him of his right to make a request for final disposition of the
indictment, information or complaint on which the detainer is
based", the Lompoc officials did not inform Mr. Martin of the
detainer until May 14, 1986, after Salt Lake County made its request
for temporary custody, and two months after Mr, Martin and the
detainer had arrived at Lompoc Prison.
In Romans v. District Court, supra, the Court found that
a fifty-six day delay in informing a defendant of a detainer against
him was not in compliance with the statutory mandate that a prisoner
be promptly informed of the source and content of a detainer filed
against him.

Id. at 481. The Romans Court held that the remedy for

the failure to promptly notify as required by Article III (c) is
dismissal of the charges (Romans v. District Court, supra at 481).
As stated in McBride v. United States, 393 A.2d 123, 127 (D.C. App.
1978):
An assumption inherent in the I.A.D., therefore, is
that an appropriate official of the 'custodial1 or
'sending1 jurisdiction will provide the prisoner
with the information necessary for him to assert his
right to trial within 180 days in the 'prosecuting'
or 'receiving' jurisdiction.
In the present case, Lompoc officials delayed 63 days
from Mr. Martin's arrival at Lompoc on March 12 to May 14 in
informing Mr. Martin of the Salt Lake County detainer and, when
officials finally informed him, they told him to notify his case
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worker if he desired speedy disposition.
explanation for the delay.

The record contains no

Pursuant to the holding in Romans,

supra, the Salt Lake County case against Mr. Martin should have been
dismissed based on the failure to promptly notify him of the
detainer.
Even though Mr. Martin was not informed of the Salt Lake
County detainer until May 14, 1986, he was nevertheless aware that
charges against him existed in Utah as early as November, 1985, and
attempted to pursue disposition of those charges. At that time, he
was refused access to the Detention Center Law Library and forced to
rely on the lawyer appointed for his federal charges to pursue such
disposition (See Addendum A ) .

On February 21, 1986, counsel sent a

letter to Richard Shepherd at the Salt Lake County Attorney's
office, informing him that Mr. Martin had been sentenced on his
federal charges and requested speedy disposition of his Utah charges
pursuant to the I.A.D.

The letter informed Mr. Shepherd of Mr.

Martin's current location and as well as information on how to
locate him, should he be transferred (Addendum B).

That letter was

received by the Salt Lake County Attorney's office on February 24,
1986.
As of Feburary 24, 1986, Mr. Martin had done everything
within his power to trigger the running of the 180 day limit set
forth in Article III of the I.A.D.

Salt Lake County was aware of

Mr. Martin's desire for speedy disposition under Article III and
aware of his whereabouts as well as information on how to locate
him, should he be transferred.
Mr. Martin was not tried until December 16, 1985, almost
ten months after Salt Lake County was informed of his desire for
- 8
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speedy disposition.

While the Agreement provides for tolling of any

periods during which the prisoner was unavailable (See Article VI
(a))/ the record indicates thatf at most/ Mr. Martin was unavailable
from May 14 f 1986/ when he was informed of the detainer while at
Lompoc Prison to June 4, 1986 when he was returned to Lompoc.
Addendum E and R. 73.)

(See

Even if the 180 day period is tolled for

that three week period/ Mr. Martin was not tried until well over 180
days after his February 21st request was received by the Salt Lake
County Attorney.
If Mr. Martin's acts prior to February 24/ 1986/ were not
sufficient to trigger the running of the 180 day period/ his acts of
May 14/ coupled with his prior acts, triggered the running of the
180 days.

As of May 14, 1986, the officials at Lompoc Prison, as

well as the prosecutors in Salt Lake County were aware of Mr.
Martin's request for speedy disposition.
When Lompoc prison officials finally informed Mr. Martin
on May 14, 1986, that a detainer on the Salt Lake County charges had
been filed against him, Mr. Martin immediately indicated to his
caseworker that he wanted to file a request for disposition under
Article III of the I.A.D., as shown by the pencil mark on the form
(R. 73, Addendum E).

The form given Mr. Martin on May 14, 1986,

indicated that should he "desire such a request for final
disposition of any untried indictment/ information or complaint/ you
are to notify your caseworker . . . "

(See Addendum E).

The

penciled notation in the upper right hand corner of that document
indicates that Mr. Martin informed his case worker that he wished to
file a request for disposition.

Based upon his efforts up to May
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14, 1986, and the information he had been given, it was logical for
Mr. Martin to assume that he had properly invoked the provisions of
Article III of the I.A.D.
The purpose of the Agreement on Detainers is to encourage
expeditious and orderly disposition of outstanding charges against a
prisoner and a determination of the proper status of all detainers
based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints (Article I
of I.A.D., Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 (1953 as amended)).

To

effectuate this purpose the agreement is to be liberally construed.
Rockmore v. State, supra, 519 P.2d 877 (Az. App. 1974).
Additionally, "the stringent sanction of dismissal is a prophylactic
provision whose aim is not to give the prisoner a windfall but is to
place pressure upon the state to give the incarcerated defendant a
speedy trial."

State ex rel Saxton v. Moore, 598 SW2d 586 (Mo. App.

1980) .
Many jurisdictions have recognized that a prisoner's
abilities to enact the provisions of the I.A.D. may be hampered by
the failure of officials to correctly advise a prisoner of his
rights under the Act.

As such, Courts have held that the only

essential requirement a prisoner need comply with is that he give
notice to the proper custodial official of his desire for a speedy
trial.

People v. Esposito, 201 N.Y.S.2d 83, 90 (1960); Rockmore v.

State, supra.

Relief should not be denied if a sending state fails

to send the appropriate certificate.

Rockmore v. State, supra at

671; a prisoner is not required to police the correctional official
to establish that the official performs his statutory duties, nor is
a prisoner required to make sure that the form of his request
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complies with the technical and procedural requirements of the
I.A.D.

Pittman v. State, 301 A.2d 509, 512-13 (Del. 1973).

otherwise emasculates the purpose of the I.A.D.

To hold

Pittman at 512;

Rockmore v. State, supra at 880. Mr. Martin's actions should thus
be viewed as sufficient to invoke the provisions of the I.A.D. both
in February and in May.

His communication as well as that of his

attorney reached the state of Utah giving the state ample
information and opportunity to act.
This Court should adopt the view that "substantial
compliance" is the test for a defendant's actions triggering the 180
day period providing the defendant gives some form of actual notice
that he desires to invoke the I.A.D.

See McBride v. United States,

393 A.2d 123 (D.L. App. 1978); Sweat v. Parr, 684 P.2d 347 (Kan.
1984).

The I.A.D. itself provides that the statute should be

liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes of expeditious
and orderly disposition of charges as set forth in Article I.

See

Article IX, I.A.D.
As to whether a defendant has substantially complied, in
McBride v. United States, supra, the Court held that this should be
determined by whether the prisoner has done everything that the
I.A.D. jurisdictions could reasonably expect, given their own degree
of compliance with an Agreement which they have the principal
responsibility to implement.

Id. at 128. Thus where Mr. Martin has

made a good-faith effort to bring himself within the Agreement's
purview, his failure of strict technical compliance would not
deprive him of the benefits of the I.A.D.

See State ex Rel. Saxton

v. Moore, 598 S.W.2d 586, 590 (Mo. App. 1980).
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In the present case, Mr. Martin initiated attempts to
pursue final disposition of the Salt Lake County charges as early as
November 1985.

Salt Lake County was aware of his request for speedy

disposition of those charges by the end of February, 1986. At that
time, Mr. Martin had substantially complied with the provisions of
Article III, and triggered the running of the 180 day limit.
Even if this Court finds no compliance as of February 24,
Mr. Martin again made substantial steps towards compliance on May
14, 1986. As a prisoner without legal training or access to legal
materials, Mr. Martin had no power to strictly comply with the
statute.

The steps taken were sufficient to inform both California

and Utah authorities of his request and therefore sufficient to
trigger the running of the 180 days.
B.

THE 180 DAY PERIOD HAD RUN BEFORE SALT LAKE
COUNTY BROUGHT MR. MARTIN TO TRIAL.

As previously outlined, Mr. Martin substantially complied
with the provisions of Article III in making his request for
disposition known in February, 1986 and again in May, 1986.
On April 11, 1986 after Salt Lake County knew of Mr.
Martin's desire for a speedy disposition under Article III of the
I.A.D., Salt Lake County prosecutors sent a letter to Lompoc
officials initiating an Article IV request.

(See Addendum D.)

While it is unclear from the record when that Article IV request was
received by Lompoc officials, it is clear that it was received by
May 14, 1986 and triggered the May 14, 1986 activity of prison
officials in informing Mr. Martin that a detainer had been lodged
against him.

Furthermore, in the letter to the Salt Lake County
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Attorney's office dated August 2, 1986, Lompoc officials referred to
the Article IV provision requiring a 30 day lag after receipt by the
appropriate authorities before a request for temporary custody will
be honored, and stated that Mr. Martin would therefore be
unavailable until June 15, 1986. This suggests that Lompoc
officials received the request for temporary custody on May 14, 1986.
Regardless of when the state filed its Article IV
request, that request did not preempt or negate Mr. Martin's Article
III request.

Article III and Article IV are designed to serve two

separate, but not mutually exclusive, interests.

The purpose of

Article III is to provide a prisoner with a means to require speedy
and orderly disposition of untried indictments so that the prisoner
will not be faced with the uncertainty of having untried charges or
be precluded from participation in prison programs due to the
existence of untried charges in other jurisidictions (See United
States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 341, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d. 387
(1978)).

The purpose of Article IV is to require officials in the

receiving state to bring a prisoner they have temporarily removed
from a prison system in another state to trial within a reasonable
amount of time so that the prisoner does not languish in the
receiving state (See United States v. Mauro, supra at 349).
In Rockmore v. State, supra at 880, the Court noted that
the receipt of a prisoner's request for speedy trial causes Article
III to become operative and Article IV is then inapplicable.

Such a

finding is reasonable in light of the purpose of Article III and the
reality that a prisoner may have difficulty strictly complying with
Article III or effectively filing an Article III request for speedy

- 13 -

disposition prior to commencement of Article IV proceedings by a
receiving state.

If an Article IV request were allowed to usurp a

prisoner's Article III request, a receiving state could make its
Article IV request and let the prisoner languish in the sending
state five or six months (as happened in the present case) then
obtain temporary custody, triggering the Article IV time clock by
the prisoner's arrival in the receiving state.

Thereafter, the

receiving state could bring the prisoner to trial within the
required Article IV 120 days, but eight or nine months after the
prisoner made his Article III request known.

Officials in recieving

states could use their Article IV requests, in all cases where a
prisoner had filed an Article III request or where the officials
knew the prisoner intended to file a request, to controvert the
protections of Article III. Thus, in all cases, Article IV could be
used to emasculate the protections of Article III, thereby rendering
Article III useless.
If this Court were to allow the State's Article IV
request to usurp Mr. Martin's Article III request, it would be
requiring the State to adhere to a superficial obedience only to the
I.A.D.

This is contrary to the purposes of the Agreement.

See

United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed. 2d 387
(1978).
In People v. Esposito, 201 N.Y.S.2d 83,- 88 (1960), the
Court noted that the law would have "wax teeth" and be little more
than a "legislative exercise in futility" if the State were allowed
to proceed with the trial fourteen months after it had received
notice of the prisoner's request for speedy trial.
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Utah must not be allowed to use its Article IV request to
extend the Article III time period after it had lodged a detainer
and/or received communication of a prisoner's request for a speedy
trial as such an action under certain circumstances could allow a
defendant's trial to be postponed indefinitely.

This Court should

hold that an Article IV request by the State of Utah may not be used
to extend the 180-day limit on trial where Mr. Martin has made a
request for disposition under Article III.
supra

See Pittman v. State,

at 509; Rockmore v. State, supra at 880.
Should Utah have determined that it needed more than 180

days to bring Mr. Martin to trial, the Agreement specifically
provides that it could have requested an extension (Article III(a);
United States v. Mauro, supra at 342) Utah never requested an
extension or continuance in this case; it simply let the time run
without taking action.
Mr. Martin was unavailable to Utah for approximately
three weeks while in Sacramento on other charges and, pursuant to
Article V that time should be tolled from the Article III 180 day
period.

However, assuming that this Court finds Mr. Martin

triggered Article III by February 24, 1986, after tolling the period
for approximately three weeks, Utah still failed to bring Mr. Martin
to trial for more than nine months, in violation of Article III. In
the alternative, should this Court determine that Mr. Martin did not
trigger Article III until May 14, 1986, Mr. Martin was nevertheless
available on June 4, 1986, more than 180 days before his December 16
trial.
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As previously outlined, Lompoc officials took more than
two months to inform Mr. Martin of the detainer (see pages 6-7 of
this brief).

In addition, Lompoc officials failed to inform Utah

that Mr. Martin was available for more than two months after he had
become available.

(See Addendum I).

In the letter dated August 22,

Lompoc officials informed Utah that Mr. Martin was available as of
June 15, with no explanation for the delay.

(See Addendum I ) . Mr.

Martin had no control over the actions of state officials, and
California's failure to send the appropriate certificate to Utah and
to offer temporary custody in a timely fashion are the types of
delay and lack of diligence that the I.A.D. is designed to remedy.
The lack of diligence by California should not be held against Mr.
Martin and can be resolved and remedied only in his favor by
enforcing the I.A.D.

See I.A.D. Article V(a); Rockmore v. State,

supra at 880; State v. Seadin, 593 P.2d 451 (Mont. 1979); Pittman v.
State, supra; People v. Bean, 650 P.2d 565, 568 (Colo. 1982).
Utah should not be permitted to rely on California's lack
of diligence.

Because of the prisoner's lack of resources and the

purposes of the I.A.D., once a prisoner triggers Article III, the
burden rests on the State to comply with the Agreement.
v. Lincoln, 601 P.2d 641 (Colo. App. 1979).

See People

To require Mr. Martin

to send additional communications to Utah regarding his desire to be
brought to trial in a speedy manner is inapposite to the purpose of
the I.A.D. and would place an unnecessary burden on Mr. Martin.
United States v. Mason, 372 P. Supp. 651, 653 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
While locating a defendant places an additional burden on the
government, to hold otherwise places a more onerous burden on the
defendant:
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See

[Alfter the prisoner has notified the receiving state
under the provisions of the Act, he has a reasonable
right to believe he has fulfilled his requirement under
the Act. If he is transferred to another jurisdiction,
the act does not require him to give a second
notification.
United States v. Mason, supra at 653-54.
In addition to California's inaction, Utah itself did not
act with due diligence after being made aware in February, 1986,
that Mr. Martin desired speedy disposition of his charges.

While

the detainer was apparently filed before Mr. Martin left New Mexico,
Utah made no attempt to gain custody of Mr. Martin until April 11, a
month and a half after the initial request.

While the record is not

clear, it appears that Utah did not hear anything about its request
until May 19 when it received the May 14 letter from Lompoc
officials indicating that Mr. Martin had been informed of the
detainer and would be temporarily unavailable (Addendum F ) .
On June 4, 1986, Salt Lake County received a letter from
Mr. Martin's Sacramento lawyer indicating that Mr. Martin had been
sentenced and renewing for the third time Mr. Martin's request for a
speedy disposition of the Utah charges (Addendum G ) .

On June 18,

Salt Lake County wrote Lompoc requesting information regarding its
April 11 request for custody.

(See Addendum H.)

Salt Lake County

received no reply to this letter until September 5, 1986, two and a
half months later.

(See Addendum I.)

During this time, the record

shows no further efforts by Salt Lake County to obtain custody of
Mr. Martin even though it had been informed on three separate
occasions beginning as early as February 24, 1986, that Mr. Martin
desired speedy disposition of the charges. A state may not ignore a
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prisoner's request for enactment of the Agreement (Pittman v. State,
301 A.2d 509 (Del. 1973) ) .
Under the circumstances and the language of the I.A.D. ,
Utah had an affirmative obligation to pursue custody of Mr. Martin
and/or to request a continuance if it appeared that the State would
be unable to bring Mr. Martin to trial within 180 days of his
request.

Mr. Martin should not be penalized for Utah's lack of

diligence and Utah should not be allowed to benefit from its
inaction.

As noted in United States v. Mason, supra at 654 (N.D.

Ohio 1973),

fl

(i)t is dictated by our system of criminal justice that

the Court place the additional burden on the government rather than
the prisoner-defendant."

In determining what acts occurred in

proceedings under the I.A.D., there can be no presumption that the
officials of a party state have performed their required duties in a
valid and regulated manner.

Romans v. District Court, supra, at

481; People v. Gonzales, 601 p.2d 644, 646 (Colo. App. 1979).

The

burden of compliance with the procedural requirements of the I.A.D.
rests upon the party states and their agents; the prisoner, who is
to benefit by this statute, is not to be held accountable for
official administrative errors which deprive him of that benefit.
Pittman v. State, supra at 514; People v. Gonzales, supra at 646;
and relief should not be denied a defendant when officials fail to
comply with the provisions to which they are bound.
Seadin, supra at 453.

State v.

The inaction by both Utah and California is

precisely the type of abuse the I.A.D. is intended to remedy and the
appropriate approach in these circumstances where Utah failed to
bring Mr. Martin to trial within 180 days of his

- 18 -

request for disposition is dismissal of the charges is against Mr.
Martin.
POINT II. THE DELAY IN BRINGING MR. MARTIN TO
TRIAL ON THE SALT LAKE COUNTY CHARGES VIOLATED
MR. MARTIN'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution guarantee an accused the right to a speedy trial, in
addition/ Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides a
similar right and Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(1)(f) codifies the
guarantee, providing in pertinent part:
(1) In criminal prosecutions, the defendant is entitled:
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district where the offense is alleged to have
been committed.
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(1)(f )(1953 as amended).
This Court has recognized that the right to speedy trial "under the
Utah Constitution is no greater or less than its federal
counterpart."

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1378 (Utah 1986).

In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the United
States Supreme Court adopted a balancing test in which the conduct
of the prosecution and the defense are weighed.

The court

articulated a four prong test for determining whether an accused has
been denied his federal constitutional right to a speedy trial. The
factors to be considered are:

(a) length of delay, (b) reason for

the delay, (c) defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial,
and (d) prejudice to defendant as a result of the delay.

The Utah

Supreme Court adopted the Barker approach in State v. Hafen, 593
P.2d 538 (Utah 1979) .
The circumstances of the case are controlling in
determining whether a delay is excessive.
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See Barker v. Wingo,

supra at 530-31.

The complexity of the charge is one factor to be

considered in determining whether a delay is excessive.

A longer

delay is permissible in bringing a complex conspiracy case to trial
than an ordinary street crime.

Barker v. Wingo, supra at 531.

Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(h)(1953 as amended), provides some
guidance in determining an acceptable length of delay.

That section

provides:
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions
or law, or be entitled to a trial within 30 days after
arraignment if unable to post bail and if business of
court permits. (emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(h)(1953 as amended).
Although this 30 day requirement is not mandatory, it is directory
and should be given substantial weight by this court.

State v.

L£zano, 462 P.2d 710 (Utah 1979).
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 (1953 as amended), the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers gives further guidance in determining the
length of delay tolerable under speedy trial provisions of the Utah
and United States Constitutions.

As previously outlined, the I.A.D.

provides that a defendant held in a penal institution of a party
state must be brought to trial within 180 days of making a demand
for disposition (Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 Article III (1953 as
amended).

Hence, the 180 day period from filing of a disposition

represents a legislative expression of the appropriate period in
which to try a defendant who is incarcerated in a party state and
requests disposition of a matter pending in this state.

The I.A.D.

also provides for the commencement of a trial within 120 days of
arrival in the receiving state where the state initiates the
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proceeding and no Article III request exists to require an earlier
trial (See Discussion Point I ) .
As previously outlined, Mr. Martin attempted to pursue
disposition of the Salt Lake County charges as early as November,
1985 (See Addendum A ) .

At that time, Mr. Martin was forced to rely

on his court appointed lawyer in pursuing a speedy trial on the
charges.
After Mr. Martin was sentenced on January 17, 1986, his
court appointed lawyer sent a letter to the Salt Lake County
Attorney, requesting speedy disposition of the Salt Lake County
charges.

That letter was received by the Salt Lake County Attorney

on February 24, 1986 (See Addendum B).

Hence, Mr. Martin asserted

his right to a speedy trial no later than February 24, 1986.
Mr. Martin again attempted to assert his right to a
speedy trial on May 14, 1986 when he marked the detainer form
presented to him by his caseworker and initiated his formal attempts
under the I.A.D. to notify the propery California and Utah officials
of his request for speedy disposition.

(See Addendum E).

He

asserted it for a third time when his California lawyer sent a
letter to Salt Lake County requesting disposition.

(See Addendum

G.)
Martin was brought to trial on December 16, 1986. Over
one year had passed since his initial inquiry into taking care of
outstanding dispositions.

Nearly ten months had passed since the

state of Utah learned of Mr. Martin's request.

And over seven

months had passed since Mr. Martin made his May 14 request.
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Neither Utah nor California provided an explanation for
the almost three month delay between the time Utah requested
temporary custody and the time California offered temporary
custody.

Mr. Martin was available for temporary custody as of June

4, 1986, when he was returned to Lompoc (R. 73). Utah wrote Lompoc
Prison on June 18, 1986, requesting information regarding its April
11 request for temporary custody.

(See Addendum H.)

Lompoc waited

until August 22 to reply; that letter was received in Utah on
September 5, 1986.

(See Addendum I.)

The officials at Lompoc

offered no explanation for the delay in responding to Utah's request
or for the fact that Mr. Martin was available for over two months
before Utah was informed.

Utah offered no explanation as to why it

made no further inquiries into the matter, a duty that is within
reason for a state anticipating prosecution of a defendant.

The

states have thus failed to offer a reason for their delay in
offering Martin a speedy trial.
A defendant who is incarcerated is prejudiced by such
incarceration while awaiting trial.

One of the rationales behind

Article III is that the lack of finality and the inability to
participate in prison programs is prejudicial to an accused.
United States v. Mauro, supra at 342.)

(See

The I.A.D. suggests that a

delay greater than 180 days from request for disposition, without
good cause, necessarily prejudices defendant.

Speedy trial rights

are designed to allow some foreseeability as to when proceedings
will be concluded.
Mr. Martin's speedy trial rights under the Utah and
United States Constitutions were violated by Utah's failure to
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pursue his case and bring him to trial within a reasonable time
after the Salt Lake County Attorney was informed of Mr. Martin's
whereabouts and his desire for a speedy disposition of his case in
February, 1986.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Martin respectfully
requests that his conviction be reversed and the matter remanded to
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for dismissal
DATED this

day of October, 1987.
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JOAN C. WATT
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ADDENDUM A

0/ l«3-B4; revised
^DEFENDANT'S
[^EXHIBIT ^ 1
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LAW LIBRARY

<fcs I

CDM
I am requesting to be allowed to use the Law Library:
DATE A b O

/?,/f?o"~

/LOCATION S~S U * v.-

PRINT NAME
3ENCE:

CASE NUMBER

^S~

2 / *?

COURT JURISDICTION:

D Civil Federal
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NOTE CHECK BLOCK PERTAINING TO CASE:
TO
3SE
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Peerx
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H<STC*LV

J!] Criminal Federal
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U Criminal District
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D Other/Explain

ASSIGNED OR ASSISTING ATTORNEYCfeTfa

ScHoS^fAp^

(

'

ATTORNEY PHONE '766

i RESIDENT SIGNATURE

DATE/C^-<S7TIME

v e d : CDM
DISAPPROVED

APPROVED,
REMARKS:

y^Xc^^uZ^

&^*-*-<<

'/TVQVS,

COM SIGNATURE

LAW LIBRARY
FORWARDED FOR YOUR COMPLIANCE

37*3

DATE

&

/TIME
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ADDENDUM B

FEDERAL PUBLIC D E F E N D E R
DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
P. O. BOX 3 0 6
ALBUQUERQUE. NEW MEXICO 8 7 1 0 3
TOVA INDRITZ
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

February 21, 1986

TELEPHONE
(505) 766-3293
FTS 4 7 4 - 3 2 9 3

Mr. Richard Shepherd
Assistant District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE:

TERRY DALE MARTIN

Dear Mr. Shepherd:
Please be aware that Terry Dale Martin is currently incarcerated
at the Bernalillo County Detention Center in Albuquerque, New
Mexico pursuant to a seven year sentence imposed by U.S. District
Court Judge Juan Burciaga in the District of New Mexico in
Criminal No. 85-219. He is hereby requesting final disposition
by your office of any indictment, information or complaint or
other charge pending against Mr. Martin in your jurisdiction.
The Bernalillo County Detention Centerfs address is P.O. Box
1293, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87103. The phone number there is
(505) 842-8008.
Mr. Martin may, in the near future, be transferred to a United
States Prison for continued service of his seven year sentence.
Should that happen, his location can be determined by contacting
the Unites States Marshallfs Office in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
phone number (505) 766-2933. It is my client's specific interest
under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, his state
constitutional right to a speedy trial and due process and his
federal constitutional right to speedy trial and due process to
have the charges pending in your office disposed of as soon as
possible by trial or otherwise.
Please contact me, his counsel in federal district court here in
New Mexico, if you need any aditional information regarding Mr.
Martin's demand for speedy trial.
/

Sinp^r^Ly,

PSt&r Schoenburg J
Assistant Federal public Defender

PS/lh-1

FEDERAL P U B L I C DEFENDER
P O . BOX 3 0 6
ALBUQUERQUE. NEW MEXICO 87103
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. S 3 0 0

J\

<

^

^

>

POSTAGE AND FEES PAIO
UNITED STATES COURTS
USC

Mr. Richard Shepherd
Assistant District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM C

United States Marshals Service
District of New Mexico

12403 United States Courthouse and Federal Building
500 Gold Avenue, Southwest
Post Office Box 444
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87103

March 13, 1986

R i c h a r d S. Shepherd
Deputy County A t t o r n e y
Courtside Office Building
231 E a s t 400 South, 3rd F l o o r
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Re:

MARTIN, T e r r y D.
Reg. N o . : 02960-051

Dear Mr. Shepherd:
Your warrant on above subject was forwarded along with our
paperwork to USP Lompoc where Terry Martin will serve his sentence.
You will need to write to the records office to assure your warrant
is outstanding. Write to the following address:
United States Penitentiary
Attn: Records
3901 Klein Blvd.
Lompoc, California 93436
Sincerely,

D. R. BACA
United States Marshal
DRB/cj

U; S. Department of Justice

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

United States Marshal
District of New Mexico
12403 V S Courthouse <& Federal BuikUmg
500 Gold Avenue, SIV
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102

/ *

o

N

\

c

<3x

^
&

20

.X

w

HV

u^
f

4

Postage and Fees Paid
U. S. Department of Justice
Jus 431

^Richard S. Shepherd
<?}' Deputy County Attorney
'
Courtside Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ADDENDUM D

(©ffte of ihs JSali ^Saks (Emmig JVttarnsg g
T.L. "TED" CANNON
County Attorr»«y

M I C H A E L N. M A R T I N E Z
OtMf Deputy County Attorney

April 11, 1986

Warden
United States Penitentiary
3901 Klein Boulevard
Lompoe, California 93436
Re:

Terry Dale Martin
Reg. No. 02960-051

Dear Warden:
I am making inquiry regarding Terry Dale Martin, whom I
understand is currently housed in your institution. We have a
local charge pending against said prisoner and wish to begin
proceedings on the Interstate Agreement of Detainers.
I am enclosing herewith Agreement on Detainers Form V
requesting temporary custody in order that you may begin the
appropriate procedures under the Detainers Act.
Would you please verify that the above individual is in your
institution and inform me of the terms of said prisoner's
confinement. Thank you for your assistance.

RICHARD S. SHEPHERD
Deputy County Attorney
kc/0173T
pc: Terry Dale Martin
Irving Marks

231 East 4th South
ration
Livingston
outy County Attorney

•

County Attorney Victim Services
Karma Oixon
Director

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
O Justice Division
Walter R. Eilett
Chief Deputy

(801) 363-7900

Q Investigative Agency
Don Harm an
Special Agent in Charge

Q Civil Division
William R. Hyae
Chief Deputy

Q Governmental Services
Donald Sawaya
Chief Deputy

jialt "Jlahe (Hountg Attorney
<"ttl*

231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111

t

* >' < \

US. POSTAGE*

</

Annas ;j ^ / ^ 0 0.2 2 j

^^fifc***0
Terry Dale Martin, Inmate
RETURN TO SENDER
\

*

#

jAiOVED
OblOT ACCEPTABLE
()INMATE UNKNOWN
ONEEIi INMATES FULL NAME A. REG #

H M E f E R 2d3b7t,i

*

AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS FORM V
Five copies. Signed copies must be sent -to the prisoner and
should be sent to the Agreement Administrator of the state .which
has the prisoner incarcerated. Copies should be retained by the
person filing the request and the judge who signs the request.
REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY CUSTODY
TO:

WARDEN, UNITED STATES PENITENTIARY
3901 Klein Boulevard, Lompoc, California 93436

Please be advised that Terry Dale Martin, who is presently an
inmate of your institution, is under Information in the County of
Salt Lake, of which I am a Deputy County Attorney.

Said inmate

is therein charged with the offense(s) enumerated below:
OFFENSE
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony
Aggravated Kidnapping, a first degree felony
I propose

to bring

this person

to trial

on

this

Information

within the time specified in Article IV(c) of the agreement.
order
hereby

that proceedings
request

In

in this matter may be properly had, I

temporary

custody

of

such

person

pursuant

to

Article IV(a) of the Agreement on DetainersSigned:
Title:

RfCHARD S.1 SHEPHERD/
Deputy County Attorney

I hereby certify that the person whose signature appears above is
an appropriate officer within the meaning

of Article IV(a) and

that the facts recited in the request for temporary custody are

Agreement on Detainers Form V
Page 2

correct
transmit

and

that

it for

having
action

duly

recorded

in accordance with

provisions of the Agreement on Detainers,

kc/0155T

said

/

request,

I here

the terras and t
/[

))

ADDENDUM E

BUREAU OF PRISONS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

In duplicate. One copy of this form, signed by the prisoner and the warden should be retained by the warden. One copy, signed by the Warden, should be retained by the prisoner.

AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS
NOTICE OF UNTRIED INDICTMENT, INFORMATION OR COMPLAINT
AND OF RIGHT TO REQUEST DISPOSITION
Inmate . . i ^ I ^ i . J f f j y . J ^ ?

No. . ° 2 9 6 0 - 0 5 } ^ . j n s t .USP^Lompoc^^CA

Pursuant to the Agreement on Detainers, you are hereby informed that the following are the
untried indictments, informations, or complaints against you concerning which the undersigned
has knowledge, and the source and contests of each.
Taking a Motor Vehicle without Permission
Rofefeer-y in the F i r s t Degree v - ^
Kidnapping in the F i r s t Degree

Aa$. acta.

f

r

" ^ ^ y - ^ v<>y „«^. C^s**

_

^ a tfsMsM";*/* 7

Sfcr

^/-^

dry,

ur^^

You are hereby further advised that by the provisions of said Agreement you have the right to
request the appropriate prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction in which any such indictment, information or complaint is pending and the appropriate court that a final disposition be made thereof.
You shall then be brought to trial within 180 days, unless extended pursuant to provisions of the
Agreement, after you have caused to be delivered to said prosecuting officer and said court written notice of the place of your imprisonment and your said request, together with a certificate of
the custodial authority as more fully set forth in said Agreement. However, the court having jurisdication of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
Your request for final disposition will operate as a request for final disposition of all untried
indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against
you from the state to whose prosecuting official your request for final disposition is specifically directed. Your request will also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or
proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein and a waiver of extradition to the state of
trial to serve any sentence there imposed upon you, after completion of your term of imprisonment in this statee Your request will also constitute a consent by you to the production of your body
in any court where your presence may be required in order to effectuate the purposes of the Agreement on Detainers and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the institution in which you
are now confined.
Should you desire such a request for final disposition of any untried indictment, information
or complaint, you are to notify . „ Jfo^-Case^.Manager
0 f the institution in which
you are confined.

You are also advised that under provisions of said Agreement the prosecuting officer of a jurisdiction in which any such indictment, information or complaint is pending may institute proceedings to obtain a final disposition thereof. In such event, you may oppose the request that you be
delivered to such prosecuting officer or court. You may request the Warden to disapprove any such
request for your temporary custody but you cannot oppose delivery on the grounds that the Warden
has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.

DATED:

8

Edwin Meese, I I I , U.S. Attorney General

_.^L}±lAl ±

(Insert Name and Title of Custodial Authority)

BY:

Peggy A. Kinman
Administrative Systems Manager

RECEIVED

DATE
INMATE

NO. ..

02960-051

MARTIN, Terry Dale

FPI LC 2-74 72C 7839

ADDENDUM F

Institution

USP, Lompoc, CA

U. S. Department of Justice
Bureau of Prisons

Date

May 14, 1986
DN LETTER
Number

Inmate's Name

JO: Office of the Salt Lake County Att]|
231 E. 4th South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

MARTIN, T e r r y Dale

02960-051 1

Your

SAME

W a r r a n t No: 85FS02430

|

Dear Sir:
The below checked paragraph relates to the above named inmate:
•

This office is in receipt of the following report regarding the above named:
. Will you please investigate this report and advise
what disposition, if any, has been made of the case. If subject is wanted by your department and you wish
a detainer placed, it will be necessary for you to forward a certified copy of your warrant to us.

gg A detainer has been filed against this subject in your favor charging

Aggravated Kidnapping

Aggravated Robbery

and

Release is tentatively scheduled for. 06-18-1990 via2/3rds

however we will again notify you approximately 60 days prior to actual release.
QJ Enclosed is your detainer warrant Your detainer against the above named has been removed in compliance with your request
•

Your letter dated

requests notification prior to the release of the above named

prisoner. Our records have been notede Tentative release date at this time is
•

I am returning your

on the above named inmate who was committed to this institution on
for the offense of

to serve

.

filed as a detainer, please return it to us with a cover letter stating your
If you wish your
desire to have it placed as a hold or indicate you have no further interest in the subject
•

The above named inmate has been transferred to
Your detainer/notification request has been forwarded.

Qg Other:

Currently t h i s inmate i s on a Federal Writ.
continue IAD process.

for

Record Form 89
April, 1978
KP! LOM 1-C3 102SCTS/PK S334°«*

Upon h i s r e t u r n , we w i l l

zgal Clerk
Administrative Systems Manager or
Chief Record Officer
Original Whits • Address®*
First Copy (Green) • Judgment & Commitment File
Second Copy (Canary) • Inmate
Third Copy (PlnK)- Central File (Section 1)
Fourth Copy (Goldenrod) « Correctional Services (Department

1

UNITED STATES PENITENTIARY
3901 Klein Blvd.
Lompoc, CA 93436
Official Business
Penalty for Private Use,

$300

Office of the Salt Lake County Attorney
231 E. 4th South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

ATTN:
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ALIA

Afk> FEES PAID

Richard s/fSpherd, Deputy County Attorney

ADDENDUM G

I C<V«

o7^

BOUT

c^*

^

'' I. A I

.

J.N.Bi/'

Cr. S-.!iS-167

TERRY DALE K
A
KARTIN
DOCKET NO."

JUDGMENT AND PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER
fn the presence of the attorney for the government
the defendant appeared in person on this date
—

Msa

W I T H O U T COUNSEL

W I T H COUNSEL

AO-245 (9/82|

DAY

MONTH

YEAR

23

However the court advised defendant of right to counsel and asked whether defendant desired to have
counsel appointed by the court and the defendant thereupon waived assistance of counsel.

Carl Larson, Esq.

L

(Name of Counsel)

i£A

^

1 GUILTY, and the court being satisfied that
there is a factual basis for the plea,

I

I N O L O CONTENDERE,

I

I NOT GUILTY

NOT GUILTY. Defendant is discharged
There being a finding/verdict of

I I

MGUILTY.

Defendant has been convicted as charged of the offense(s) of

:
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The court asked whether defendant had anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced Because no sufficient cause to the contrary
was shown, or appeared to the court, the court adjudged the defendant guilty as charged and convicted and ordered that: The defendant i l
hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period of r i V L \ V .

YE.-35 pursuant to- ^ ^ U j , zrtQ «.isfendant is lo recsfvs credit for r.!me served.
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In addition to the special conditions of probation imposed above, it is hereby ordered that the general conditions of probation set out on the
reverse side of this judgment be imposed The Court may change the conditions of probation, reduce or extend the period of probation, anc(|
at any time during the probation period or within a maximum probation period of five years permitted by Saw, may issue a warrant and
revoke probation for a violation occurring during the probation period.
The c o u r t orders c o m m i t m e n t to the custody of the Attorney General and recommends,

TMBfT
iMEATON

It is ordered that the Clerk deliver
a certified copy of mis' judgment
and commitmenctg the U.S. Marshal or other quaiifie8 officer
CERTIFIED AS A'TRUE COPY%ON
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THIS DATE
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T.L. "TED" CANNON
County Attorney

^ 8 96

MICHAEL N. MARTINEZ

/

Chief Deputy County Attorney

June 18, 1986

A. J. Battles, Legal Clerk
United States Penitentiary
3901 Klein Boulevard
Lompoc, California 93436
Re:

Inmate Terry Dale Martin
Reg. NOo 02960-051

Dear A, J, Battles:
I received your detainer action letter of May 14, 1986,
regarding the above-named inmate.
I was subsequently notified by
the office of the Federal Defender that he was sentenced in the
United
States
District
Court
for
the Eastern District
of
California on May 28, 1986,
Could you advise me as to the
current status of our request for custody under the Interstate
Act on Detainers.
Mr. Martin has had counsel indicate his demand for a speedy
trial and we are ready to take custody for the purpose as soon as
he is available.

RICHARD S. SHEPHERD
Deputy County Attorney
kc/0304T
cc: Terry Dale Martin

231 East 4th South
stration
A. Livingston
)eputy County Attorney
mnistrative Affairs

Q County Attorney Victim Services
Karma Oixon
Director
4th Floor

Saft Lake City, Utah 84111
3 Justice Division
Walter R. Ellett
Chief Deputy
3rd Floor

(801) 363-7900

Q Investigative Agency
Don Harman
Special Agent in Charge
4th Floor

O Civil Division
William R Hyae
Chief Deputy
2nd Floor

D Governmental Service
Donald Saw ay a
Chief Deputy
2nd Floor

ADDENDUM I

3901 KUin Blvd.
lompoc, CA 93436

August 22. 1986
TeL. Cannon
Attorney for Salt Lake County
231 E. 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:
MARTIN, Terry D.
Reg#: 02960-051
DOB: 11-04-52
Dear Mr, Cannon:
Pursuant to your request for temporary custody of Mr„ Martin under Article IV
of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, enclosed are forms BP-DIR-93 and 94.
Article IV provides "that there shall be a period of thirty days after receipt
by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored," You request was
received by this office during May, 1986.
Mr. Martin was advised of your
request on May 14, 1986. Therefore Mr. Martin will be available to be taken
into state custody on or after June 15, 1986, unless you are notified to the
contrary.
Before we can transfer Mr. Martin to your custody, we must receive
the Agreement on Detainers Form VI (Evidence of Agent's Authority to Act for
Receiving State).
Final arrangements for pickup may be made by contacting our Administrative
Systems Department at 805-735-2771.
Please have your agents contact them 48
hours prior to pickup.
Be assured of our continued cooperation in matters of mutual interest.
Sincerely,

Administrative Systems Manager

cc:

Clerk of the Court
Compact Administrator
J L C File
Inmate

BUREAU OF PRISONS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

In the case of an inmate's request for disposition under Article III, copies of this Form should
be attached to all copies of Form 2. In the case of a request initiated by a prosecutor under
Article IV, copy of this Form should be sent to the prosecutor upon receipt by the warden of
Form 5. Copies also should be sent to all other prosecutors in the same state who have lodged
detainers against the inmate. A copy may be given to the inmate.

AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS
CERTIFICATE OF INMATE STATUS

RE: „.]^£*N_,_ Terry
(Inmate)

?2^0-° 5 ] L

JI?L'-J^??Ji

(Number)

^J^PfL^i-^-J

(Institution)

(Location)

The (custodial authority) hereby certifies :
1. The term of commitment under which the prisoner above named is being held: 7 y e a r s
4205(a)
2. The time already served: Date sentenced 01-17-76 7-months +90 days J.C,
J a i l Credit: 10-19-85 to 01-18-86 = 90 days
3. Time remaining to be served on the sentence:
4. The amount of good time earned:

5 6

2251 d a y s

days

5. The date of parole eligibility of the prisoner: 0 2 - 1 6 - 8 8
6. The decisions of the Board of Parole relating to the prisoner: (if additional space is
needed use reverse side) N / A
7. Maximum expiration date under present sentence:

10-18-92

8. Detainers currently on file against this inmate from your state are as follows:
Agg. R o b b e r y / A g g . K i d n a p p i n g

DATED:

.&W*±J1LJ1*L

Edwin Meese, III-U.S. Atty. General
Custodial Authority

CSU.o^ O ^ ^ ^ AGt- ^cr*
"MBY: Peggy Kinman, Admin. System Mgr,
FPt-LOM-1-14-77

BP-DIR-94
2-71

BUREAU OF PRISONS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

In the case of an inmate's request for disposition under Article III, copies of this Form should
be attached to all copies of Form 2. In the case of a request initiated by a prosecutor this Form
should be completed after the Warden has indicated his approval of the request for temporary custody or after the expiration of the 30 day period. Copies of this Form should then be
sent to all officials who previously received copies of Form 3. One copy also should be given to
the prisoner and one copy should be retained by the warden. Copies mailed to the prosecutor
should be sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested.

AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS
OFFER TO DELIVER TEMPORARY CUSTODY
Date --Au<3ys„t.2J2.z.-JL986
,-*
TO:

Mr. T . L . Cannon
„

.

_
^
_,.
Prosecuting Officer

(Insert Name and Title if Known)

^alt^^Lajce^^ity^^Uj^ah
(Jurisdiction)

And to all other prosecuting officers and courts of jurisdictions listed below from which indictments, informations or complaints are pending.
RE:

MAPTTN,

T^rry

Number ...Q23J5.Qr.Q.51.U*l

.

(Inmate)

Dear Sir:
Pursuant to the provisions of Article V of the Agreement on Detainers between this state
and your state, the undersigned hereby offers to deliver temporary custody of the above-named
prisoner to the appropriate authority in your state in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had of the indictment, information or complaint which is (described in the attached
inmate's request) (described in your request for custody of -4.trJUL-=8£)•
(Date)
(The required Certificate of Inmate Status is enclosed.) (JH&ftjraqittkfedCfe^^
(Date)
If proceedings under Article IV (d) of the Agreement are indicated, an explanation is attached.
Indictments, informations or complaints charging the following offenses also are pending
against the inmate in your state and you are hereby authorized to transfer the inmate to custody
of appropriate authorities in these jurisdictions for purposes of disposing of these indictments, informations or complaints.
Offense

County or Other Jurisdiction

Agg. Robbery

County, Salt Lake City

&rjg. y-iririApp-ing

C o u n t y , S a l t Lake C i t y

Offense (cont'd)

County or Other Jurisdiction (cont'd)

If you do not intend to bring the inmate to trial, will you please inform us as soon as possible?

Kindly acknowledge.

MwiJl-K5jessL-IIX«..Il^S^.J^tIyiy^--General
(^ame and TitKfofCustodial Authority)

0*sfc*L- V X A L V 3 j9t<<+ft$
Pe<

JLP^BY-

?9Y Kinman, Admin. S y s t e m Mgr.

«.UAE^.J 4 omBQC^.33^1-iaeJJi.Bl.vd,..LDjripoc
(Institution and Address)

93436

A. My counsel is
(Name of Counsel/

whose address is

„J^__(|j^„3£k__^
(Street, City, and Stats')

(£o_gl.2U_rJ22Z

V

£ZZ—X2ji-JlLfJ

B. I request the court to appoint counsel.

/

FPI-LOM-1-14-77

'

(inmate's Signature)

ADDENDUM J

77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment into law
— Text of agreement The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby
enacted into law and entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions
legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows:
The contracting states solemnly agree t h a t
ARTICLE I
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner,
detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and
difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other
jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner
treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party
states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and
orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status
of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or
complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to
such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction,
cannot properly be had in the absence of co-operative procedures. It is the
further purpose of this agreement to provide such co-operative procedures.
ARTICLE II
As used in this agreement:
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States
of America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant
to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof.
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had
on an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article IV hereof.
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ARTICLE III
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a terin of imprisonment in a
penal or correctional institution of a party state, aricl ^heneveF'du?lfigfthe
continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other
party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis
of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be
brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered
to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting
officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and
his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good cause shown in open court, the
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request
of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate
official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment
under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned,
the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state
parole agency relating to the prisoner.
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden,
commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who
shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate
prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested.
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having
custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his
right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information
or complaint on which the detainer is based.
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all
untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed.
The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody
of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers
and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the
prisoner's request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being
initiated by the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph
shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written notice, request,
and the certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or
complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the
original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information or complaint
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shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an
order dismissing the same with prejudice.
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to
a paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition
with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included
therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to
the receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after
completion of his term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request
for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the
production of his body in any court where his presence may be required
in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent
voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this paragraph
shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law.
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of
the request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall
void the request.
ARTICLE IV
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried
indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have
a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a
term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance
with Article V (a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in
which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly
approved, recorded and transmitted the request; and provided further that
there shall be a period of 30 days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which period the governor of
the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or
availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner.
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already
served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of
good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any
decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts
in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with
similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.
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(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall
be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any
prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be
opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original
place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) hereof, such indictment,
information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and
the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
ARTICLE V
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof,
the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state
where such indictment, information or complaint is pending against such
person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the
request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary
custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of
this agreement. In the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority
in the receiving state shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided
by this agreement or to the prisoner's presence in federal custody at the
place for trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by the
custodian.
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of
temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the
state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given.
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint
on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of
which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary
custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment,
information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been
lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or
Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the
indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an
order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon
shall cease to be of any force or effect.
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(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only
for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints
which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on
any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction. Except
for his attendance at court and while being transported to or from any
place at which his presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held
in a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting prosecution.
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner
is otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement,
time being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall
be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as
provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to
remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state
and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same
manner as an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any
other manner permitted by law.
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory
and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one or more
untried indictments, informations or complaints are pending or in which
trial is being had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay
all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping and returning the prisoner.
The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless the states concerned
shall have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or affect any
internal relationship among the departments, agencies and officers of and
in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor.
ARTICLE VI
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said
time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is
unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of
the matter.
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by
this agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally
ill.
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ARTICLE VII
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting
jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this
agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information necessary to the effective operation of this agreement.
ARTICLE VIII
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state
when such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any
proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time
such withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect
thereof.
ARTICLE IX
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any
phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be
contrary to the Constitution of any party state or of the United States or
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement and
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this agreement shall be held contrary to the Constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall
remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force
and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

